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Abstract 
Offshore wind farms in future meshed offshore grids could be subject to different regulatory 
regimes. Feed-in tariffs would absorb market risk from wind farm operators, whereas price premium 
mechanisms leave operators exposed to market price signals. In this case, it plays a decisive role 
which price applies to a node in an offshore grid. 
The offshore node will either be integrated into any of the neighbouring markets, with access to the 
respective maximum price, or be subject to separate nodal pricing. We investigate the different 
regulatory regimes for connections to one to four countries based on a stochastic model capturing 
uncertainties in prices and line failures. 
The stochastic analysis shows that in case the wind park is granted access to the respective 
maximum price, there is a significant option value connected to the operational flexibility of 
accessing several markets: The wind farm’s IRR can increase by up to 33% in the analysed (fictive) 
cases when connected to four neighbouring countries. Contrarily, in case of nodal pricing, the wind 
farm will have to cope with IRRs that are up to 15% lower when connected to more than one 
country. These effects can either hamper adequate investment or lead to windfall profits, if the level 
of support were not adjusted according to the choice of regulatory regime. This should therefore be 
considered when designing the regulatory regime and level of support in the offshore grid in order 
to maintain an effective and efficient development of offshore wind in Europe.  
 
1. Introduction 
Offshore wind power is one of the cornerstones for achieving a higher share of renewable energy 
sources (RES) in a number of coastal European countries. Despite a comparatively high number of 
full-load hours in comparison to fluctuating onshore technologies, offshore wind is still a rather 
expensive option due to its remoteness. The connection of offshore wind farms (OWF) to the shore 
is a main cost component which can amount to about 25% of total project costs [1]. This holds 
especially for far-offshore projects where HVDC cable systems and respective converters are 
required. Substantial savings potentials can be realised if several neighbouring OWF are connected 
via a single interconnector. This has already been done in Germany and regulatory implementation 
suggestions under the British OFTO regime are currently under discussion [2]. 
Until now, the connection of OWF is mainly pursued from a national approach. An exception is the 
Kriegers Flak project where Denmark, Germany and possibly Sweden at a later stage collaborate 
on a common offshore node. OWFs in close proximity are to be erected at the offshore border 
triangle of these countries. Joining the connections to national shores would allow for electricity 
trade and could thus become a first case of an integrated infrastructure serving offshore wind as 
well as international electricity exchange. Similar projects are also under discussion for the Irish Sea 
and for the North Sea [3]. There, it is demonstrated that a common connection of OWFs as well as 
further connections between them can lead to large cost savings and extra benefits from electricity 
transmission of up to 21 bill. Euro for the North Sea region. Research in this field is increasing: 
beside the aforementioned sources, [4] suggest a methodology for an optimal topology of an 
offshore network. From a legal point of view, [5] and [6] analyse offshore electricity grids and their 
potential implementation. They distinguish several cases, among them one where an OWF is in 
addition to its ‘home’ country also connected to one other, or where it forms part of a meshed 
offshore grid.  
All of these analyses deal with offshore grids from a macroscopic perspective. The successful 
implementation will however in reality likely depend on good regulatory set-ups for single projects – 
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both for OWF and for transmission. Despite that, the amount of studies dealing with the effect of 
offshore grids on an OWF is limited: [7] shows that participation in national balancing markets 
constitutes a main part of an OWF’s economy and that changing this situation to several markets 
impacts the business case. Depending on the support scheme and resulting economic incentives, 
the OWF or the transmission system operator (TSO) may act strategically with regard to several 
power markets [8]. 
The effect of multiple connections under different regulatory regimes on the OWF’s business case 
has to our knowledge not yet been scientifically analysed. This understanding is however of utmost 
importance when designing the regulatory regime in order to ensure adequate investment 
incentives for OWFs and transmission capacity. An offshore grid will only reap the expected 
benefits if OWFs are built as planned; if, by contrast, the connection to an offshore grid leaves the 
OWF at a higher risk, the result may be contrary to the intention. We approach this research gap of 
multiple connections with a real-options approach: under different support scheme constellations, 
additional cables are connected to the OWF which may find itself in a neutral offshore price area. In 
the case of price premiums and exposition to market price fluctuations, prices are different than 
under a single national affiliation. To recognise the possibility of additional connections being 
established during the project’s lifetime before taking an investment decision is a significant 
parameter in the investment analysis of an OWF in an offshore grid that can only be dealt with in a 
real-options analysis.  
 
Figure 1 illustrates the different fictive connection cases we distinguish in this paper: the benchmark 
case is a 600 MW OWF connected to country A by a cable with the same capacity. This connection 
can be complemented by additional 600 MW interconnectors to the neighbouring markets B, C and 
D. We further distinguish two policy regimes for all countries: In the first case, the OWF can sell its 
power at the highest market price of the countries it is connected to. We will refer to this case as the 
‘primary access’ case in the following. Alternatively, the OWF receives the price that applies to the 
offshore hub under nodal pricing. The latter case could apply especially for internationally 
coordinated support schemes in the future to ensure neutrality between the neighbouring countries 
(see e.g. [9], and sources therein). 
 
 
Figure 1: Overview of connection options 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: first we address the applied method, including a 
detailed description of the model developed and an explanation of the considerations for the 
different analysed cases. Next, we address the quantitative assumptions that are common to all 
cases, before turning to the quantitative results. The subsequent discussion and conclusion 
sections conclude the paper providing qualitative analyses and first considerations on policy 
options. 
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2. Method  
2.1 A stochastic model for the value of a wind park under price uncertainty  
We use a well-established and often used approach (based on [10]) to develop a stochastic model 
of the spot electricity price in four countries. We let the electricity price be a stochastic process 
following a Brownian motion. The stochastic behaviour of prices, including drift and volatility, are 
exogenously given to the model. It has often been shown that most commodities in general and 
electricity prices specifically show characteristics of mean reversion and seasonal patterns [11]. 
Considering the nature of our analysis (being a comparative one), mean reversion will indeed affect 
the comparative attractiveness of the different analysed scenarios, especially because the cases 
are sensitive to small price differences between the countries. Seasonal patterns however are not 
expected to modify the comparative attractiveness of the cases significantly, as they would apply 
similarly to all countries. Therefore, we chose not to include seasonal patterns in the model at this 
stage. 
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The price processes are modelled as plain mean reverting Wiener processes. The stochastic 
change of price in each time step ݀ݔ is expressed with the mean reverting stochastic process: 
   (1) 
Where: 
  is a Wiener process with independent increments at 
  
   is the mean reversion factor of the market (exogenously given) 
  is the standard deviation of the market (exogenously given) 
כ  is the ‘normal’ level of the price ݔ , to which it tends to revert, i.e. the long-run marginal cost 
of production in an electricity system.  
 
The processes are Markovian, meaning that the distribution of future prices is only dependent on 
the present price and not the past history of prices, i.e. it follows fundamental signals. In this 
framework, the price ݔ  in each time step can be calculated from the previous price plus the 
expected change ݀ݔ from a stochastic process: 
  (2) 
 
For the simulation, we use the related first-order autoregressive process in discrete time (see [10], 
p. 76): 
  (3) 
Where: 
ݔഥ  is the ‘normal’ level of ݔ௧, to which it tends to revert. ݔ௧ includes a drift in the process and is 
therewith also dependent on ݐ 
  is a normally distributed random variable with mean of zero and variance of 
ఙమ כ ሺ1 െ ݁ିଶ఑ሻ  (4)  
 
Having the stochastic price processes for all four countries in place, we then model the hourly 
expected future cashflows of the wind park mainly dependent on revenues from sales into the 
different spot market based on the restrictions given by the different cases we investigate.  
We then aggregate the future cashflows over the analysis period, i.e. the lifetime of the wind 
project, and add a traditional discounted cashflow calculation to determine the project value, here 
expressed as the internal rate of return in each scenario and each realisation of the stochastic price 
process [12]. 
 
  (5) 
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here: 
 is the internal rate of return in each realisation of the price processes in each scenario 
and negative cashflows) 
ݐ  
ܶ e of the wind park  
 
inally, we run an N=1000 Monte Carlo simulation of different realisations of the price processes in 
2.2 A model for stochastic line failures 
 to the model. We model the probability of occurrence of 
g up 
c
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here: 
is the value of available interconnection capacity, being restricted to 0 ൑ ݕ௧ ൑ ݕො  
ݕො n capacity between 
ߢ overy rate of the exponential process towards the maximum available capacity 
݅ሺ௧,ఌሻ is the variable that activates the line failure, with  
 0 , ߝ௧ ൌ 0 
ߝ௧  is a Poisson distributed random variable with mean of ߣ , ߝ௧ ~ ܲ݋݅ݏሺߣሻ 
ߣ
݆   outage, with 
  0 , ݐ ് ݐ௣ ൅ ߠ௧  
ݐ௣   is the maximum value of ݐ, in wh h a line failure last occurred, with  ݐ௣ ൌ ݐ  ܽݐ ߝ௧ ൐ 0 
ߠ௧ dard deviation of ݀,  
݀   is reflecting the expected number of hours the outage lasts 
 
2.3 Cases  
We use the model to analyse several different cases, which are interesting in the light of a wind 
park investment with the option to be connected to several different countries under various 
W
IRR
NPV is the net present value of the wind park 
ܥܨ௧  is net cashflow in period t (net of positive 
 is the time period of the Cashflow 
   is Number of periods, i.e. the lifetim
F
order to determine the mean and standard deviation of the net present value of the project for the 
different cases. 
 
We add the option of stochastic line failures
a line failure with a Poisson distribution ܲሺߣሻ, which reflects the nature of the failures much better 
than e.g. a normal distribution. This modelling approach is comparable to modelling of jump 
processes in commodity prices (see e.g. [13]). The probability of duration of the line failure is 
modelled as a normal distribution ܰሺ0; ݀ሻ. We also add an exponential recovery process for the 
available capacity ݕ௧ when rampin after the line failure, approaching exponentially to the 
maximum available apacity ݕො, the nominal capacity of the interconnection capacity between the 
wind park and the respective country. 
 
 
ݕ௧ 
W
  is the nominal capacity, i.e. the maximum available interconnectio
the wind park and the respective country. It also serves here as the jump size in the 
Poisson process, meaning that the failure is expected to always affect 100% of the 
capacity 
is the rec
ݕො 
݅ሺ௧,ఌሻ  ൌ ൜ 
1 , ߝ௧ ൐ 0  
   is reflecting the expected number of line failures per year 
ሺ௧,ఏሻ is the variable that activates the recovery process after an
݆ሺ௧,ఏሻ  ൌ ൜
1 , ݐ ൌ ݐ௣ ൅ ߠ௧  
ic
  is a normally distributed random variable with mean of zero and stan
ߠ௧ ~ܰሺ0; ݀ሻ 
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rks. We compare the results of the different scenarios, especially in terms of 
 premium in all markets 
 
orrelations 
3. 
ssume a fictive case with four archetypical markets and a typically sized offshore wind farm of 
600 MW. We assume the addition of 600 MW interconnectors to the other countries as main 
regulatory framewo
value for the investors in relation to the base case. Any additional value related to the operational 
flexibility of being connected to other countries is investigated as the option value of the additional 
interconnection. 
A main difference between the regarded cases is the support scheme: under feed-in tariffs (FIT), a 
guaranteed fixed remuneration per MWh is paid for a fixed number of years (or generation hours). 
Selling the generation on power markets and correction of forecast errors is administered by an 
agent, typically the TSO, leaving the operator of the OWF with only limited market risk. Under feed-
in premiums (FIP), this task is left to the operator of the OWF: the operator receives a fixed 
premium per MWh generated, but needs to sell the generated electricity on power markets.  
Since there are no existing offshore nodes without demand, and a pricing scheme for future 
offshore nodes has not been decided upon yet, we investigate several different cases. Under a FIT 
scheme, an OWF is indifferent to the pricing rules; under a FIP scheme, the underlying spot market 
price that can be obtained plays a decisive role. The most straightforward option is the price in the 
offshore node is always identical to that of its home country. However, in this case, additional risk 
evolves only from balancing issues and not from the spot market income [7] which is in the focus 
here. With regard to spot pricing, we regard two cases and differentiate according to the pricing 
rule: we assume that an OWF has either primary access to all markets or that nodal pricing applies 
for the offshore hub. In the case of primary access, it always incurs the highest spot market price. 
This reduces the necessary support but in return, reduces the congestion rent income of the TSO. 
The other option is that the TSO can always incur the maximum amount of congestion rents 
possible and that the price signal to generation in the offshore node is optimal. This leads to the 
effect that congestion rent income is high, whereas the OWF receives only the second- or third-
highest price – corresponding to the country to which the interconnector is uncongested [8]. 
Besides the support scheme and the pricing rule, a number of other factors are crucial for the 
economics of an OWF. The most substantial of them are the connections of the OWF to 
neighbouring countries. In the benchmark case we assume only one connection to one market. If, 
at a later stage, this situation is altered by additional connections to other markets, the profitability 
of the OWF can be significantly impacted – positively or negatively. In this regard, the number of 
connections, their capacities as well as the timing of the additional connections are crucial 
elements.  
In addition to the connections, two other parameters are worth investigating: risk of failure of any of 
the transmission lines might impact the business case of the OWF significantly, depending on the 
regulatory set-up. Especially relevant for the stochastic analysis and therewith the option value is 
the strength of price correlation between the investigated markets. 
These considerations lead us to the following cases that we investigate during the remainder of the 
study: 
1. One country – benchmark case 
a. Feed-in tariff 
b. Price premium 
2. Primary market access and price
a. Two countries 
b. Three countries  
c. Four countries 
3. Offs rice premium in the offshore markethore hub price and p
a. Two countries 
b. Three countries  
c. Four countries 
4. Special cases 
a. Line failures 
cb. High spot market 
 
Assumptions  
 We a
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 between the cases. This has a crucial effect on results: the capacity of the wind 
Figure 2: Exemplary outage results for the 4 interconnectors over a full year 
 
The wind time series is based on measured wind data at the FINO1 platform in the Southwestern 
part of the G  an hourly 
roduction pattern accordingly to [16] and approximately adjusted for wake effects. The 600 MW 
he wind park is only connected to one country, the wind park is, depending 
on the regulatory framework and renewable support mechanism, exposed to the market of the one 
s. 
distinction criterion
farm is such that typically, all its power can be sold into one market. Other capacity combinations, 
especially combined with different electricity price characteristics in the neighbouring countries, 
would most likely have a considerable impact on the results. However, the authors prefer to present 
the results of the described simple set-up because a more complicated structure of the cases would 
partially conceal differences between policy choices 
The electricity price processes for all four countries (see section 2.1) share the same fictive 
parameters, though they are not correlated between each other (except for one case with a focus 
on a correlation of 0.9 between market A with B, C, D). More specifically, the starting mean value is 
50 Euro/MWh with a drift of +1 Euro/MWh towards the end of each year. The volatility before and 
after mean reversion are set at 1.5 and 2.228, respectively, while the mean reversion coefficient κ is 
set at 0.01. 
Regarding the stochastic line failures (see section 2.2), we assume that on average 3 annual 
interruptions occur with an average duration of 50 hours. Due to the Poisson distribution 
characteristics, the frequency and duration of line failures typically exhibit single shorter interruption, 
representing planned maintenance, and rare interruptions of longer duration, representing planned 
maintenance (see Figure 2). The average failure duration of 150 hours per year corresponds to 
1.7% outages per year, which is regarded to lie in a realistic range [14][15]. The spike mean 
reversion parameter, reflecting the return speed to nominal capacity, is set at 0.05. 
 
0
200
400
600
MW
 
erman sector of the North Sea for the year 2006. It has been processed into
p
OWF is assumed to have a lifetime of 25 years, about 4475 full load hours, investment cost of 2,450 
mill. Euro/MW and operational expenditure of 0.07 mill. Euro/MW/year. Apart from the rather high 
value for full load hours derived from wind time series, these numbers are in line with [17] and 
estimated to be realistic for the nearest years to come.  
4. Quantitative results 
4.1 One country – base case 
In the base case where t
country and the volatility of its price
In case the wind park receives a guaranteed price in form of a feed-in tariff, the wind park is not 
exposed to the volatility of that market and all Monte Carlo simulations result in the same IRR for 
the wind park (see Figure 3, left). In case of a fixed price premium paid out in addition to the market 
price, the wind park is exposed to the underlying volatility and the Monte Carlo simulations yield a 
normally distributed outcome of the IRR (right). The expected mean IRR corresponds in our fictive 
case to the IRR in based on a Feed-in tariff. The standard deviation is 0.4%-points. This result 
forms the basis of comparison for our further analyses. 
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Figure 3: IRR for feed-in tariff support (left) and price premium support (right) 
4.2 Primar
In cases w  value 
park can choose into which market it sells the electricity and 
verage price from choosing the highest price at any point in time – 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: IRR probability distribut ns under primary market access 
 
Next to this rather obvio w much the 
standard deviat ecreases when 
dding more countries. This is due to the fact that the wind park is less exposed to the volatility of 
re hubs, not only the option of higher expected IRR when connecting to 
 way that the offshore hub forms its own price area, the 
se a market of one of the adjacent countries and therewith the 
lmost all realistic cases, there will be at least one connection from the 
 
 
 
y market access 
ith primary access, the option to be connected to different countries increases the
of the wind park significantly. The wind 
can therewith achieve a higher a
the more countries are connected, the higher the value of the wind park (see  
Figure 4). 
 
 
 
io
us result of a higher expected IRR, it is interesting to see ho
ion, which we use as indication for riskiness of the investment, d
a
market prices in one country as it has the option to switch sales to any other country whenever a 
low price period occurs. 
The value of the operational flexibility in this regulatory regime results in an up to 33% higher IRR in 
the four-country case (up from 9.8% to 13.0%) with a constant feed-in premium. In future valuations 
of wind parks and offsho
more countries should be taken into account, but also the risk reducing effect of diversification into 
several markets, stemming from the fact that revenues of the wind park are less exposed to low 
price periods in a single country. This effect is increased when taking line failures into account, 
whereas it is decreased when considering correlation between the market prices of adjacent 
markets. In our example, the IRR decreased by 0.6%-points when considering a two-variate 
correlation of all countries with country A. 
4.3 Offshore price hub 
In case the regulations are chosen in such
wind park will not be able to choo
market price to sell at. In a
wind park to a country which is not congested, and the offshore hub price will thus equal the price of 
that market. This will typically not be the highest available price. Therefore, the wind park will be 
valued at a lower level than in the case of primary access. 
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Figure 5: IRR probability distributions under nodal pricing at the offshore hub 
 
The model cts the 
wind park es are 
onnected to the offshore price hub, the hub will always form a price that corresponds to the lower 
n to one country and 
se, assuming primary access to the highest-price market. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: IRR probability distribution changes considering line failures 
 
The impact on the s significant in 
the one-countr d in case the 
ind park is connected to four countries as the probability that all four lines have failures at the 
course, the compensation framework needs to taken into account here. In case the wind park 
 
 
 
 
 
results reveal an interesting characteristic of how this regulatory framework impa
under the assumption of identical interconnector capacities. When two countri
c
of the two prices; therefore the impact is very significant with a decrease of ca. 15% (from 9.8% to 
8.4%). In a case of three countries, the offshore price hub will form a price that corresponds to the 
medium of all three prices. Some of the impact of the two-country case is mitigated. In a four 
country case, however a price will form that corresponds to the second lowest of the four market 
prices. The resulting IRR probability distributions are illustrated in Figure 5. Of course, the 
differences of the cases are much less pronounced if there is significant price correlation between 
the markets of the countries especially when including periods of equal prices. 
4.4 Line failures 
We analyse stochastic line failures as described above in the case of connectio
for comparison in the four country ca
 
wind park value – in case of no compensation through the TSO – i
y case. Almost the complete negative effect of line outages is mitigate
w
same time is very low. Moreover, the consequences of a line failure to the highest-price market are 
reduced because of access to several alternative markets. 
This result can be of significant impact for the future valuation of wind parks in offshore hubs. Of 
 
 
operators are fully compensated for line outages, there will be no measurable impact on the wind 
park value. In that case, this analysis can be used for risk
 
EWEA 9 
 
2012 Conference, Copenhagen  
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
M
ea
n 
IR
R
 [%
]
Stand d Deviation [%]ar
Benchmark Primary access Offshore hub Line failures High price correlation
3
4
2
2
3
4
 analysis of the TSO’s income from the 
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age is different for nodal pricing in the offshore hub, where the 
Figure 7: Comparison of all cases 
4.1 Congestion rents 
Until now, the focus of our analy ts on the OWF. Let us now turn 
towards the other main party inv estion rents (see Figure 
they increase with the number of connections and are higher under nodal 
 access. The latter effect is least pronounced for the three-country case: 
interconnection operations, as the compensation payments will significantly affect the TSO’s 
financials in that case.  
4.5 Comparison of all cases 
An overall comparison of all cases is illustrated in Figure 7. The standard deviation and the mean 
IRR values are shown in
connection (red), all primary access ca
additional interconnector. The im
case with 3 countries provides the highest IRR after the one-country case. The cases with line 
failures (dark blue) are connected by lines with their respective benchmark cases. It is clearly visible 
that the effect is much more pronounced for the one-country case than for the four-country case. 
Yet more distinctive is the change when assuming a high price correlation between markets: the 
IRR decreases while the standard deviation increases remarkably. This illustrates that option values 
between several cases are highly dependent on the underlying assumptions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
sis has been on the economic effec
olved, the TSO. This is addressed by cong
8). As could be expected, 
pricing than under primary
here, the primary access and nodal pricing cases differ only by approx. 41 mill. Euro on average. 
The reason is that comparatively good case for the OWF under nodal pricing, which is at the 
expense of congestion rent income. 
 
 
Figure 8: Congestion revenues under different regulatory regimes 
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5. Discussion 
This study presents an analysis on the economic effects of different regulatory regimes on offshore 
wind farms. It quantifies the impact of different regulatory regimes on the OWF and shows that a 
connection to several markets affects the return and risk structures if they are not absorbed by other 
mechanisms, e.g. a TSO provision. The cases are fictitious, but carry the notions of the main points 
the authors wish to highlight. We have limited our analysis to spot markets. In reality, balancing 
markets and their prices might be a very decisive factor in choosing on which market to sell. The 
cases and countries investigated do not represent a realistic market environment. Before drawing 
conclusions on real cases, the model should be calibrated to real market characteristics, especially 
the level and volatility of the markets are decisive. This, however, could first be applied for a real-
world case where the interconnector capacities and market price characteristics are known and 
where the offshore node’s generation is handled differently than national onshore generation. In 
addition, the authors expect that sensitivity analysis on interconnector capacities to fferent 
markets would  here. A main 
simplification taken is that we look at real option values for the whole lifetime of the project. This 
rency, but would probably not apply in real-world cases: additional interconnectors 
anisms. Our results show this may need to be handled on a 
-interconnector basis: while the connection to a third country is beneficial for the 
di
lead to remarkably different quantitative results than presented
supports transpa
are first decided upon after the offshore wind farm comes into operation. So, for more realistic 
cases, a sensitivity analysis on additional interconnectors only after a certain number of years would 
provide valuable insights. 
6. Conclusions 
We have shown that the regulatory framework, especially market access rules, has a significant 
impact on the valuation of a wind park in an offshore hub. Our analysis shows that the connection of 
different markets into an offshore hub can have a positive effect of up to 33% increase of IRR as 
well as a negative impact of up to 15% decrease of IRR on the wind park business case, depending 
how the regulatory framework is designed. If wind park operators are not compensated for lost 
revenue in case of line failures, the connection to several countries diminishes the risk of line 
failures. 
Our results can be used when considering how to design a cross-border offshore hub, such as 
envisaged in the Kriegers Flak area, to make an informed decision. In order to balance incentives 
for investment and socio-economic efficiency, the support level, i.e. in our case the fixed price 
premium, could be adjusted according to changes in wind park value and riskiness. 
The presented results emphasise that the incorporation into an offshore grid is not neutral for the 
OWF. This leads to the question of how to compensate for possible losses or gains under the 
suggested regulatory mech
interconnector-by
OWF under nodal pricing, the connection to a fourth country is negative. Thus, different 
stakeholders like TSOs and OWFs may take different positions towards new cables at different 
stages of an offshore grid erection process – which may hamper the construction of new lines that 
are beneficial from a holistic viewpoint. 
For further research, we envisage to overcome some of our model limitations by further developing 
and implementing the presented methodology. The focus of analysis could also be turned from 
offshore wind farms to a balanced picture between OWF and TSOs: solutions that are 
advantageous for the OWF could be detrimental for the TSO, and vice versa. Thus, a stronger 
focus on revenue and risk characteristics of interconnectors from a TSO perspective needs to be 
envisaged. 
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